Public Officials And Employees Ethical Obligation To Avoid Even Indirect Financial Conflicts Of Interest

Public employees and officials have ethical obligations that are unique to them and are part and parcel of their roles in the public sector.  For example, they are required to act in the best interests of the public at all times. They are charged with the fiduciary duty to protect and manage public funds, and must at all times conduct themselves and their business dealings in accordance with ethical standards, regulatory requirements, and the public trust.  Violations of ethical obligations carry a multitude of consequences that vary depending on the type of offense.  Penalties can range from civil or criminal sanctions to permanent forfeiture of state public office. In addition, when government employees fail to comply with ethical obligations they may also be subject to discipline, up to and including discharge.

Government Code section 1090 prohibits government employees and officials from being financially interested in a contract made in their official capacity.  The public official or employee must not be distracted by personal financial gain, or even by the possibility of personal financial interest. The statute removes or limits any possibility that an official or employee will be influenced by any direct or indirect personal interest when making an official decision.

The term “financial interest” is not defined by statute.  However, through the courts, and opinions issued by the Attorney General, we generally understand the inquiry to be whether a public employee may realize any private gain which would cause his or her loyalties to be divided in serving his or her employer.  For purposes of Section 1090, if a contract would benefit an employee or official’s source of income, it benefits the employee official and a violation occurs.

The financial interest can be direct or indirect.  For example, an official or employee has a “financial interest” in the community property earnings of his or her spouse. This is true even if the couple has an agreement to treat their earnings as separate property (i.e., a “prenuptial agreement”).  Just recently, for example, the Attorney General issued an opinion addressing whether the financial interests of one spouse would be attributable to the other spouse under Section 1090 if the couple had a prenuptial agreement specifying that each spouse has no present or future financial interest in the income or assets of the other. The Attorney General opined that the financial interests of the spouse would still be attributable to the public official.  The Attorney General opined that a person’s interest in a spouse’s employment and income is a per se financial interest within the meaning of Section 1090. Although the scope of prenuptial agreements has expanded over time, the law still imposes an affirmative obligation on each spouse to support the other during marriage.  So, for example, a city council member cannot enter into a contract that would financially benefit his/her spouse because that financial interest will be  indirectly attributed to the council member.  And, having a prenuptial agreement in place will not extinguish the financial conflict interest that exists.

The consequences of a Section 1090 conflict are harsh.  A public employee or official cannot avoid a conflict merely by abstaining from the decision-making process.  Moreover, a single public official’s interest in a contract prevents the entire legislative body from entering into the contract.  Finally, a contract that violates Section 1090 is absolutely void.  Since a void contract from a legal standpoint does not exist, it means the contract is not enforceable. 

If a court finds a contract void because of a Section 1090 violation, it can impose various remedies including the requirement that the party with the illegal interest forfeit and repay monies obtained through the contract.  Disgorgement of profits is particularly likely, since public officials and other fiduciaries cannot profit by a breach of their duty.  Further, a public official who violates the statute, even in reliance on legal advice, may still face both civil and criminal liability. Anyone who willfully violates Section 1090 may not only be punished by a fine or by imprisonment, but may also be forever disqualified from holding any public office in California.

IRS Clarifies Tax Treatment Of Employer-Provided Cell Phones

The IRS has issued a notice clarifying the tax treatment of employer provided cell phones and similar telecommunications equipment for business purposes.  The notice provides guidance on two key issues regarding employee cell phone use. 

Person-using-cell-phone.jpgFirst, if an employer provides an employee with a cell phone for “noncompensatory business reasons,” the IRS will treat the employee’s use of the phone for business purposes as a “working condition” fringe benefit.  This means that the value of this use is excludable from the employee’s income.  Second, if the employee uses the employer provided cell phone for personal calls, the value of the personal use will also be excludable from the employee’s income as a de minimis fringe benefit.

According to the IRS, a cell phone is provided for “noncompensatory business reasons” if there are substantial business related reasons for giving the phone to the employee.  These reasons can include the need to contact the employee at all times for work related emergencies or for the employee to contact clients while away from the office.  However, a cell phone is not provided for “noncompensatory business reasons” if the cell phone is given to the employee to “promote the morale or good will of an employee,” to recruit a prospective employee, or to provide additional compensation to the employee.

The IRS clarified its position following questions it received following passage of the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 which removed cell phones from the definition of listed property for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2009.  When cell phones were included in the definition of listed property, employers and employees were required to keep detailed records of whether calls made on employer provided cell phones were for work or personal purposes.  This put an enormous record keeping burden on employers.  If no such records were kept, the value of the cell phone and the accompanying service were deemed “perks” that should have been treated as taxable income to the employee.  As a result, numerous employers were being hit with back tax charges by the IRS.  Some may remember that UCLA was slapped with nearly $240,000 in back taxes a few years ago.      

The IRS’ clarification regarding the tax treatment of work issued cell phones is welcome news to employers.  Now, employers and employees will not have to go through the onerous process of reviewing cell phone bills to separate work from personal calls and then include the value of the personal calls in the employee’s taxable income.  Nonetheless, employers who already have a cell phone policy should review it to make sure it clearly states that the phone should be used for business purposes only.  In addition, the policy should discourage employees from using employer provided cell phones for personal use.  Finally, employers who do not have a cell phone use policy should adopt one.

Lawmakers Deal Another Blow To Missouri's "Facebook Law"

Facebook.jpgIn August we reported on a new Missouri law that regulated communications between teachers and students on social media websites.  We also reported on the Missouri State Teachers Association’s (“MSTA”) successful efforts to block this so-called “Facebook Law” by obtaining a preliminary injunction from a Missouri Court.  Now, Missouri’s Legislature has voted to repeal the controversial portion of the law which barred teachers from communicating with students on social media platforms that allow “exclusive access.”  The Legislature also extended the deadline for school districts to establish social media use guidelines from January 1 to March 1, 2012. 

Missouri’s Governor signed the bill into law last Friday.  As a result, the MSTA said it would decide in the coming weeks whether to dismiss its case.  Currently, a court hearing is scheduled for February 20 to decide whether the original version of the law should be permanently enjoined.

Although the MTSA appears to be satisfied with the new bill, the ACLU expressed disappointment with the Governor’s failure to veto the bill.  Specifically, the ACLU is concerned that school districts will not be able to create social media policies that also protect free speech rights.  John Chasnoff, program director for the ACLU of Eastern Missouri, told the St. Louis Post Dispatch “We think the legislature kicked the can down the road on this issue and just passed the buck to local school districts.  It’s been so difficult for the legislature to hammer out a bill that meets the needs and is constitutional.  Imagine how difficult it will be for school boards.”

2012 Public Sector Employment Law Conference - Registration Now Open!

This guest post was authored by Liebert Cassidy Whitmore

 

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Registration is now open for the Annual Liebert Cassidy Whitmore Public Sector Employment Law Conference, which takes place February 2-3, 2012 at the Hyatt Regency, San Francisco.  The conference is geared towards Public Agency Management and includes a variety of informative and entertaining presentations that offer practical lessons for success in the workplace.

Employment Law is an ever changing and exciting area of the law and the conference is designed to help participants learn and apply best practices.  Some of the sessions include:

  • Demystifying the FLSA: 15 Common Solutions To Unknown Problems
    The complexity of the FLSA makes it easy for public employers to inadvertently violate the law.  During this workshop, we will discuss the 15 most common problems we see and how to fix them.  Do you have liability for your employees' use of cell phones and smart phones?  Do you pay for comp time at the   correct rate?  Do you have to include holiday pay in the regular rate calculation?  Do your overtime payments correspond to your FLSA workweeks?  Find out why these questions are important to ensuring that your agency is complying with the FLSA.
  • Retirement Made Simple: FAQs and Town Hall Discussion
    PERS, CERL, STRS, DB, DC, EMPC, and PEMHCA.  Do you know what these letters mean?  Come learn from our panel of experts, who will answer your public employee retirement related questions.  In addition to answering questions, our experts will discuss the most frequently asked questions about making changes to retirement benefits.  You will also learn about the   latest retirement-related trends and pending legislative action.  All retirement systems welcome, including CalPERS, '37 Act systems, and STRS.
  • Avoiding Difficult Conversations Is Riskier Than You Think
    You have been there, and probably avoided it.  And who wouldn't?  Conversations about performance problems, workplace conflict, or personal hygiene issues aren't easy.  Even everyday conversations with difficult co-workers are events that we all try to avoid.  This is your chance to gain some insight into the dynamics of these interactions, your role in creating them and steps that can be taken to pull the conversations back from the brink of disaster.
  • When Johnny (or Janie) Comes Marching Home -- Hooray, Your Veterans Are Back...Now What?
    Many public employees are also reserve military members or members of military families. This session will address frequently asked questions regarding the rights of military member - employees and the complex issues which can arise when a military member returns from active duty.  Does an employee accrue vacation and sick leave while on military leave? What if the employee misses a promotional exam while he/she is on leave? What if the employee returns from active duty with a disability, such as PTSD? Can you require a returning veteran to submit to a fitness for duty exam? Can an employee use FMLA leave to assist a family member who is in the military? What about the CFRA? Grab your American flags and join us for a practical discussion regarding the laws and issues   surrounding the employment of military members.
  • OMG!  Did U C Her Facebook Post?!?! The Risks and Rewards of Accessing and Viewing Employees' Online Activities
    Facebook, Twitter, Blogging - privacy and potential liability issues arising from employee social networking are becoming more prevalent in the workplace. This workshop will address not only ways to respond to inappropriate employee use of social networking media, but when employers can use this same media in hiring, investigations and discipline without running afoul of employee privacy rights and anti-discrimination laws.  This workshop will discuss Social Media, Privacy Rights, and best practices for public agencies and their employees.
  • Wait, I Thought I Fired You!  Challenging Unemployment Insurance Claims
    This workshop addresses technical and strategic   questions that may arise when employers receive notice that a terminated employee has filed an unemployment insurance claim.  An award of benefits to a laid off employee is one thing, but why would benefits be granted to an individual who has been fired for misconduct?  What defenses are available?  How does the appeal process work?  Are there ever hidden advantages to pursuing an appeal?  Through interactive case studies, this workshop will answer these questions and more. Topics include eligibility issues, timelines and other procedural considerations, and strategies for dealing effectively with the administrative agencies involved in the unemployment insurance appeals process.
  • Free Speech - You Can't Say That, Or Can You?
    An employee criticizes a supervisor on Facebook.  An agency fires an employee over a You Tube video.  An Association member verbally attacks a manager after a tense negotiating session.  This interactive workshop will focus on a number of real-world scenarios that will help attendees navigate through several common free speech issues.  Social media, tough economic conditions and other factors have all contributed to an increased tension between an employee's free speech rights and an agency's need to carry out its duties.  Join us for a lively discussion of this very  timely subject. 

Register now and access the full brochure

Also, follow us on Twitter and tweet with us using the hashtag #lcwac12.  For questions regarding the upcoming annual conference, please send us an email or call 310.981.2000.

We hope you can join us and look forward to seeing you! 

New State Laws Establish Gender Identity, Gender Expression, And Genetic Information As Protected Classifications

This guest post was authored by Connie C. Almond

 

DNA.jpgThe Governor recently signed into law AB 887 and SB 559, which prohibit harassment and/or discrimination based on gender identity and expression, and genetic information, respectively. 

Individuals who are transgender identify themselves with a gender that is different from their “assigned” sex.  The term transgender also applies to individuals who dress or behave in ways socially associated with the opposite sex. 

The California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) prohibits discrimination and harassment based on various specified protected classifications, including sex and gender. Courts have interpreted these terms broadly to include other non-enumerated personal characteristics.  Over the last several years, many California courts have interpreted FEHA to protect transgender individuals.  However, although 70% of transgender Californians have experienced workplace discrimination or harassment, many are unaware that they are protected.  Similarly, many employers are unaware that transgender discrimination is unlawful.

Consequently, AB 887 amends FEHA to specifically include “gender identity” and “gender expression” as part of the term “sex.”  Gender identity refers to a person’s deeply felt internal sense of being male or female.  And gender expression refers to one’s behavior, mannerisms, appearance and other characteristics that are perceived to be masculine or feminine.  AB 887 clarifies that FEHA prohibits, for example, the harassment of a male employee who wears make-up, wears skirts, or behaves effeminately. 

California law has not previously addressed discrimination based on genetic information.  In the mid and late-1900s, employers sometimes used genetic screening to disqualify applicants from employment.  Because some genetic traits are most prevalent in particular groups, genetic screening stigmatized or discriminated against specific ethnic or racial groups.  In 2008, Congress passed the Genetic Information and Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) which prohibits employment discrimination based on genetic information. 

SB 559 adds this same protection to FEHA and other California laws.  Employers are now prohibited from discriminating against a job applicant or employee based on the individual’s genetic tests, genetic tests of the individual’s family members, or the manifestation of a disease or disorder in the individual’s family members.  It has long been unlawful to discriminate against someone who, for example, has a parent with Huntington’s Disease (because the individual is associated with someone with a disability).  Under SB 559, however, an employer may not discriminate against an individual on the basis that the individual is a potential carrier of the Huntington’s gene and may one day exhibit symptoms of the disorder.

Employers should update their harassment policies to reflect these changes and train managers and supervisors regarding these new protected classifications.

U.S. Supreme Court Considers Limits Of Ministerial Exception

This post was co-authored by Michael Blacher

God said “Be fruitful and multiply.”  But does that make a math teacher at a religious school a “minister?”  The United States Supreme Court will soon decide.

On October 5, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, a case which involves the application of the “ministerial exception.”  That exception allows religious organizations, including religious schools, to make employment decisions affecting “ministers” without being subject to anti-discrimination laws.  The ministerial exception is a judicial creation rooted in the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment clauses.  The Hosanna-Tabor case requires the Supreme Court to define the meaning of a “minister” and, in particular, to determine whether it can extend to a teacher at a religious school who instructed primarily on secular topics. 

The facts of Hosanna-Tabor are as follows.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School operates a church and an elementary school.  It has two types of faculty: (1) limited-term “lay” or “contract” teachers and (2) for-cause “called” teachers.  Called teachers must complete a course of religious study and receive a certificate of admission into the teaching ministry.  They receive the title of “commissioned minister.” 

In 2000, Cheryl Perich began work as a contract teacher but shortly thereafter changed her status to a “called” teacher.  Her employment duties remained essentially the same.  She taught math, language arts, social studies, science, gym, art, and music.  However, Perich also taught a religion class four days per week, attended a chapel with her class once a week, and led her classes in prayer. 

In 2004, Perich went out on disability leave.  The School Board ultimately offered Perich a “peaceful release” agreement wherein she would release claims against the School in return for a monetary payment.  When Perich refused and threatened legal action, however, the Board fired her.

Perich filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) for disability discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the EEOC decided to litigate the charge of retaliation on her behalf.  The district court determined that Perich was covered by the ministerial exception and granted summary judgment to the School. 

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.  It found that because most of Perich’s job duties did not have a religious character, and that her “primary” functions were secular, the ministerial exception did not apply.  The School appealed to the United States Supreme Court which granted certiorari.

On October 5, 2011 the Court heard oral arguments.  The Justices did not appear to reach any kind of consensus.  Justices Sotomayor and Kagan appeared focused on the rights of all employees to bring retaliation claims.  Justice Roberts asked whether the Court could involve itself in this issue at all when some religions considered all members to be witnesses to the faith and “ministers” of sorts.  Justice Breyer’s questioning stood apart by appearing to suggest the exception should apply only if the employment action at issue rested on church doctrine and called upon courts to decide religious questions.    

The attorneys’ positions were equally diverse.  Counsel for the EEOC contended that the ministerial exception should not apply to retaliation claims.  The Assistant to the Solicitor General suggested that the ministerial exception should not apply at all since schools were regulated by the State.  The attorney for the School avoided articulating a precise definition of a “minister,” but during his rebuttal he proposed “[a] minister is a person who holds ecclesiastical office in the church or who exercises important religious functions . . . including teaching of the faith.”  Oral arguments ended without a clear sense as to how the Justices might rule.

The Supreme Court’s holding in this case will prove very significant for religious schools and organizations, and our firm will provide a supplemental report when it issues.

Governor Signs AB 646 Mandating Factfinding For MMBA Agencies

This guest post was authored by Connie C. Almond

 

On October 9, the Governor signed AB 646 amending the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act to require factfinding as a means of resolving an impasse in labor negotiations under certain circumstances.  Under the new law, charter cities and counties that have impasse procedures which include, at a minimum, a process for binding arbitration are not subject to the factfinding procedures.

AB 646 repeals existing Government Code section 3505.4, which permitted unilateral implementation of an agency’s last, best and final offer following exhaustion of “applicable” impasse procedures, and enacts new Section 3505.4, requiring factfinding if a mediator is unable to effect a settlement within 30 days of his or her appointment and the union requests factfinding.

AB 646 also adds Government Code section 3505.7 which provides in pertinent part that after “any applicable mediation and factfinding procedures have been exhausted . . . a public agency that is not required to proceed to interest arbitration may, after holding a public hearing regarding the impasse, implement its last, best, and final offer . . .” 

The catch is that existing Government Code section 3505.2 remains unchanged and does not require an agency to agree to mediation.  That raises the very important question whether an agency can avoid factfinding altogether if it chooses not to agree to mediation.  If factfinding only kicks in after an unsuccessful mediation, and an agency does not have to agree to mediation, it is arguable whether factfinding is really required. 

Starting January 1, 2012, if factfinding is indeed required, a union may request that the parties submit their differences to a factfinding panel following unsuccessful mediation.  In an apparent oversight, the legislation fails to place a time limit on the union’s ability to request factfinding.  The union and the agency each select a panel member and the chairperson of the panel is either mutually agreed upon by the parties or appointed by the PERB.  Within 10 days of its appointment, the factfinding panel will meet with the parties and may make inquiries and investigations, and hold hearings.  The parties equally bear the costs of the chairperson, and each party bears the costs of their appointed panel member.

The panel must reach its findings and recommendations based on eight criteria:

  1. State and federal laws that are applicable to the employer
  2. Local rules, regulations, or ordinances
  3. Stipulations of the parties
  4. The interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability of the public agency
  5. Comparison of the wages, hours, and conditions of employment to employees performing similar services in comparable public agencies
  6. The cost of living
  7. The overall compensation presently received by the employees
  8. Any other facts which are normally or traditionally taken into consideration in making the findings and recommendations

There will likely be litigation over the ambiguities in the new law and/or the Legislature will enact clarifying legislation.  In the meantime, agencies should consult with their legal counsel to plan for the impact, if any, of AB 646 upon negotiations starting on January 1.

NLRB Provides Guidance On Regulating Employee Use Of Social Media

This post was co-authored by Elizabeth Arce

 

Social-media-icons.pngIt seems that every time you turn on the news some new technological innovation is being announced.  For example, recent weeks have seen the unveiling of new tablet computers and smartphones.  In addition, social media platforms such as Facebook and LinkedIn are constantly announcing upgrades to their websites to improve the way users communicate with one another via the internet.  However, just as technology is rapidly changing, the law regulating the use of social media by employees also continues to evolve. 

Since our initial blog posts and article on legal developments regarding employee social media use, the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) Office of General Counsel released a report analyzing various issues relating to social media use by employees and employer policies that attempt to regulate it.  In addition, two NLRB Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”) issued decisions that provide further guidance in these areas. 

In Hispanic United of Buffalo (“HUB”), an ALJ ordered a nonprofit corporation to reinstate five employees who were fired after posting comments on Facebook criticizing workload and staffing issues.  The ALJ concluded that the employees engaged in protected concerted activity because they were discussing matters that involving terms and conditions of their employment. 

In Knauz BMW, an ALJ found that a car dealership’s employee handbook contained policies that restrict and limit an employee’s right to engage in concerted activity.  However, the ALJ upheld the employer’s termination of an employee who posted pictures of an accident at another dealership, also owned by his employer, with unflattering comments about the salesperson involved in it on the grounds that the posting was not protected concerted activity.

These recent pronouncements from the NLRB clarify the law regarding the scope of social media use by employees and provide the following guidance to employers:

  1. Employees’ Social Media Postings With Each Other About The Terms and Conditions of Their Employment Are Protected.  Employees engage in protected concerted activity when they use social media to communicate with one another about work related issues.  Concerted activity will also be found when the employee posts comments that express the views of other employees or that attempt to initiate or induce coworkers to take group action.  This can include complaints among employees about commissions, tax withholding practices and workload and staffing issues.  Thus, posts that are not work related or that express individual gripes, frustrations or complaints are not protected. 
  2. Work Related Postings That Are Sarcastic or Mocking in Tone May Be Protected.  In Knauz BMW, the ALJ considered two Facebook postings by the employee.  The first involved criticism of a sales event, including the inadequacy of the food being served, which employees felt could affect employee compensation.  The second posting involved an accident at another dealership.  The ALJ found that the posting concerning the accident was not protected concerted activity, and that the employer terminated the employee for that posting.  The decision discusses what language rises to the level of disparagement necessary find otherwise protected activities unprotected.  The NLRB has found statements that are mocking or sarcastic ,and terms such as “a-holes” and a “cheap son of a bitch” attributed to supervisors to be protected concerted activity when uttered in the course of otherwise protected concerted activity.  Employers must meet a very high threshold to prove language is disparaging and beyond protection in the context of employees acting together to challenge their working conditions.
  3. Polices That Can Be Reasonably Interpreted to Restrict Employees’ Right to Engage In Concerted Activity Are Improper.  In evaluating whether a social media policy improperly limits an employee’s ability to engage in protected concerted activity, employers should ask whether the rule or policy explicitly prohibits the exercise of this right or would reasonably tend to chill the employee’s exercise of it.  In order words, policies that could be interpreted as discouraging an employee to discuss the terms and conditions of employment are likely improper.
  4. Policies That Can Be Reasonably Interpreted to Protect the Relationship Between the Employer and Its Customers Are Proper.  In Knauz BMW, the ALJ determined that language in an employee handbook stating “[a] bad attitude creates a difficult working environment and prevents to [employer] from providing quality service to our customers” was proper.  The ALJ reasoned that the employer had a right to demand that its employees not display a bad attitude towards customers in order to protect the employer’s relationship with its customers.

Employers who have adopted social media policies should review them with the above guidelines in mind.  Finally, because the law in this area continues to rapidly change, employers should stay tuned to this blog and our Twitter (@lcwlegal and hashtag #lcwsocialmedia) for further updates.

Documentation Of Poor Work Performance Defeated Claims Of Discrimination And Retaliation In Violation Of The ADA

Performance-Review.pngHow many times have you heard LCW attorneys tell you to timely and accurately complete performance evaluations?  You likely hear this advice at every Employment Relations Consortium training you’ve attended.  A recent case reminds us all how crucial honest performance evaluations and other forms of progressive discipline can be.

In the case of Dickerson v. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 522,   Bobby Dickerson was employed as a part-time janitor by an Illinois Community College District.  Between 2005 and 2007, his supervisor gave him written warnings issued for his refusal to perform work assignments, failure to secure job-related equipment, and for leaving the worksite without permission.  In 2005, 2006 and 2007, Dickerson applied for full-time positions with the district, but never succeeded.  Shortly after his third failed attempt at a promotion, Dickerson complained to the district that he was being discriminated against because of his “personal traits” and a speech defect. 

Dickerson then received a performance evaluation in December, 2007 for the period of November, 2006 through November, 2007.  Dickerson received “unsatisfactory” ratings in three of the seven performance categories.  The supervisor also provided written comments such as, “Dickerson is consistently late for work and needs to improve;” “jobs need to be redone because of not listening to the job instructions;” and that Dickerson “does only the bare minimum to meet job requirements.”  Dickerson disagreed with the evaluation and filed a grievance with his union alleging the district gave him the evaluation in retaliation for his exercise of union activities.

In February, 2008, Dickerson filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging the district failed to promote him to a full-time position because it believed he was mentally disabled in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).  Dickerson had a below average IQ which indicated “mild mental retardation.”

Shortly after filing the EEOC complaint, Dickerson approached the Vice President of Human Resources and asked what he should be doing differently in order to be promoted to a full-time position.  The Vice President replied to the effect of, “you are suing your employer and you should not be suing your employer.”

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