2012.png2012 promises to be a significant year for freedom of expression in America, not only because protest movements are expanding across the country in various forms, but also because 2012 is an election year.  And, it will not be just any election, but one involving a “show down” of forces that have railed against each other for years, with rising intensity.

The coming year will also bring significant developments in First Amendment law as it applies to public employers and to educators.  The following are six primary areas worth watching:

1.  Camping and “Occupying” as Protected First Amendment Activity:  Because some public educators are being asked to permit camping on their property as a form of protest, educators will have to watch closely for decisions in this area of the law in 2012.  The forcible removal of a number of occupied camps has led to litigation over the question of whether city actions, and the regulations on which those actions were based, violated the First Amendment.  Under Supreme Court precedent, symbolic conduct itself can qualify as expressive activity meriting First Amendment protection.  The Occupy movement and others have argued that camping on public property now constitutes a mode of expression that should be afforded heightened constitutional protection.  There is, however, already U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the 1984 decision Clark v. Community for Creative Non–Violence, providing that the government may prohibit overnight camping on public property even when the camping is for expressive purposes (in that case, to bring attention to the plight of the homeless).  This fall, a number of district courts addressing Occupy challenges have already applied Clark to enforce government restrictions on overnight camping determined to be content-neutral and reasonable.  Attorneys for protestors nevertheless continue to challenge government enforcement of such regulations, and, it can be argued, they now have more than twenty-five years of precedent since Clark to use to justify a different result consistent with that case’s reasoning.  Significant appellate decisions in this area will likely issue next year.

2.  First Amendment Protection for Falsehoods:  The U.S. Supreme Court will decide soon the unique case of United States v. Alvarez, which concerns the extent to which the First Amendment protects speech that is false.  Alvarez concerns the constitutionality of the Stolen Valor Act, which prohibits individuals among other things from falsely claiming they have won U.S. military distinctions.  The defendant, when speaking in his capacity as a water district board member, falsely boasted that he had received the Congressional Medal of Honor. He was subsequently convicted for violating the Stolen Valor Act.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (covering California) found that the statute did not pass a “strict scrutiny” standard of review under the First Amendment.  Some judges on the Ninth Circuit, however, expressed the view that the statute, in fact, is constitutional, primarily because speech that is false cannot have First Amendment protection.  They also reasoned that prohibiting false speech does not, except in narrow circumstances, have an excessive chilling effect on protected speech.  The Supreme Court recently decided to review this case. 

A holding by the Supreme Court that false speech can have direct or indirect First Amendment protection may prompt public employees to make free speech retaliation claims in more sets of circumstances.  For example, a broad Alvarez holding could inspire an employee disciplined for knowingly or recklessly wrong speech to claim the speech nevertheless has First Amendment protection precluding discipline, or that the agency rule at issue chills even truthful speech, under expansive Alvarez reasoning.  A clear holding by the Supreme Court that false speech as a general principle lacks constitutional protection would help rule out those types of claims, which in most cases would likely lack merit in any event given the substantial harm false statements can cause in work at public agencies and in schools.  

The Alvarez case is thought to present a close question, however.  For a vivid discussion of supposed First Amendment dangers in statutes like the Stolen Valor Act, see Chief Judge Kozinksi’s concurrence in the Ninth Circuit’s denial of rehearing, which invokes the specter of the “truth police” and lists scenarios in which a “utopia” that allowed criminal prosecution of any falsehood would be “terrifying.”  The U.S. Supreme Court oral argument next year and the Court’s opinion will receive substantial attention from academics, lawyers, the press, and the public. 

3.  The Definition of “Official Duties” for Purposes of Public Employee Free Speech Claims:  Federal courts of appeal will probably also provide a more detailed analysis of what constitutes “official duties” for purposes of free speech claims by public employees.  In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Garcetti v. Ceballos, that a public employee cannot assert a free speech claim against his or her employer if the speech at issue was rendered pursuant to “official duties.”  Since 2006, courts across the country have developed sometimes conflicting standards for applying Garcetti.  Some courts, notably the Second Circuit (encompassing New York), have recognized “official duties” to encompass basically anything the employee does in the work context to advance his or her generalized job goals.  In Weintraub v. Board of Education, the standard was considered to include a teacher’s wholly voluntary act of filing a grievance regarding working conditions.  This broad definition of “official duties” may be adopted in the next year in other circuits as well.  


Continue Reading The First Amendment In Public Employment And Education – Six Issues For The Year 2012

students-on-campus.JPGMany public universities and colleges in California want to establish policies regarding what kind of speech can occur on campus.  But doing so can be hazardous.  Imagine you are tasked with establishing a policy that governs organized student speech on your campus.  What would be reasonable?

Without a lot of legal guidance, you might propose the following: being careful, you might say, “none of the campus is considered any kind of ‘public forum’ for speech activities.”  But, to be generous, you might also say, “all of the walkways surrounding the school library will be considered a free speech zone for students and outsiders.”  The area is not heavily trafficked, and makes up only a small portion of the campus, but you expect that at least some students and other passersby will be able to see demonstrations or activities in the area specified.  Again being generous, you write, “student organizations and outside groups must apply to use the free speech zone for demonstrations or distributing literature, and the college guarantees it will respond to the applications in fifteen (15) days, and will only deny permission for a proposed demonstration if it is manifestly inappropriate for an academic environment as determined by the Chancellor or by his or her designees.” 

This campus policy doesn’t sound crazy.  And it certainly does not create a police state or Orwellian dystopia.  After all, it permits even demonstrations that criticize the college or its policies, since most people would agree such demonstrations would not, if reasonable, qualify as “manifestly inappropriate for an academic environment.” 


Continue Reading Formulating Effective College Freedom Of Expression Policies Under The First Amendment