For a decade or more, the phenomenon of “cancel culture” – sometimes called “accountability culture” – has been the subject of national debate. On one side, institutions explain they have a strong interest in maintaining a safe and welcoming environment for their workers and should have the ability to remove individuals who threaten that environment. Institutions also claim a legitimate interest in distancing themselves from and denouncing speech that contradicts their values, and even an interest in disciplining or terminating an employee whose speech contradicts those values in a sufficiently serious way. At the same time, many point out that our nation has a strong tradition that individuals should lead their lives speaking publicly and privately whatever they wish to say, and that the threat of “cancellation” imperils important rights.
For public agencies, these considerations take on not just public policy, but legal importance. Public agencies are bound by the First Amendment in their treatment of workers, and they can commit a constitutional violation if they discipline an employee based on speech a Court determines to be constitutionally protected. An employee who wins a lawsuit for violation of free speech rights can obtain significant damage awards and can typically recover attorneys’ fees, among other types of relief.
How do public employers determine what employee speech is protected? This post explains general legal tests and then summarizes two federal appellate cases from the last year that illustrate how these tests apply. Both are from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (the federal circuit covering California, Oregon, Washington, and other western states) and set precedent for how courts will decide these questions in the future. Both are in the public education context, but shed light on how courts will view scenarios in other types of public employment settings.
The First Amendment Test:
Courts have developed a general test for whether a public employee’s speech has First Amendment free speech protection. Under this test, the First Amendment protects a public employee from being disciplined for their speech (1) on matters of “public concern,” (2) that is outside the scope of the employee’s “official duties,” and (3) that prevails in a balancing test which weighs disruption of a government agency’s operations against the importance of the speech interest at issue. As Courts have phrased it, the balancing is “whether the [state]’s legitimate administrative interests outweigh the employee’s First Amendment rights.” The first two elements of the test described above serve to rule out several broad categories of speech from consideration. Speech that is not a matter of “public concern” can be, for example, speech about internal office dynamics, interpersonal conflicts, or more mundane workplace grievances. “Official duties” speech constitutes that which an employee renders as part and parcel of their job, e.g., a policeman talking to a motorist they have stopped, a social worker providing counseling, or a fire inspector writing a citation. For speech that passes these first two “tests” (public concern and outside official duties), Courts must apply the third element, the balancing test of competing interests.
The following two cases provide illustrations of how Courts have interpreted this balance in the face of community calls for “cancellation.”
Virulent Political Speech on a Private Facebook Account:
In Thompson v. Central Valley School District No. 365[DU1] , decided December 29, 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether a middle school assistant principal’s inflammatory criticism on Facebook of the 2020 Democratic National Convention had First Amendment protection so as to protect him from discipline by the school district for the speech. Thompson’s Facebook post disparaged the Convention, used a disability-based epithet in doing so, labeled its speakers “hateful racists” including a derogatory term for women, and threatened that critics would be taken “to the woodshed for a proper education.” Although Thompson explained that he intended his post to reach only his Facebook friends, it was disclosed and came to the attention of his fellow school district employees.
The speech was outside Thompson’s official duties and, although inflammatory, on a matter of public concern (partisan politics), so that the Ninth Circuit’s task was to balance the appropriate interests under the third step in the test.
In conducting the balancing, the Court concluded that the school district had shown a reasonable prediction of disruption and that the district had a legitimate interest in maintaining a safe, inclusive educational environment and in avoiding workplace disruption that outweighed Thompson’s free speech interests. The Court emphasized that, particularly given Thompson’s supervisory role, the district’s interest in ensuring administrators foster a positive educational climate was weighty and that Thompson’s derogatory and violent language (including reference to the “woodshed”) could disrupt school operations.
Because the school district’s interests outweighed Thompson’s speech interests, the Court held that Thompson’s First Amendment rights were not violated and he could be disciplined.
The following reasoning from the Court emphasized the clash between Thompson’s role at the district and the nature of his comments:
The [Central Valley School District (“CVSD”)] reasonably predicted that a Facebook post by a school administrator using disability-related slurs and violent language was likely to disrupt CVSD operations. The predictable disruption was intensified and reinforced by Thompson engaging in speech while serving in a public-facing role as an assistant principal that undermined the CVSD’s written resolution to foster a safe and supportive educational environment. As an employee of the CVSD, Thompson had a responsibility to uphold the district’s formal commitment to equity and inclusion. As evidenced by his Facebook post and workplace comments, Thompson did not uphold his commitment, and we accordingly find that Thompson’s derogatory and violent language could substantially disrupt the orderly operation of the school.
A Professor’s Provocative Statement and a Claim for Academic Freedom Protection:
A second case, decided December 19, 2025 (amended May 14, 2026), reached a different result, finding the inflammatory speech in question protected. In Reges v. Cauce[DU2] , the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the University of Washington violated Professor Stuart Reges’s First Amendment rights in its response to the professor’s controversial syllabus statement.
Reges, a computer science instructor, had added to his syllabus a line parodying the university’s recommended Indigenous land acknowledgment. At public universities, a land acknowledgement is a formal statement that recognizes and honors the Indigenous peoples who have historically stewarded and continue to have enduring connections to the land on which a university is located, and the statement serves as a gesture of respect. In 2015, the University adopted the following acknowledgement and recommended the instructors include it on syllabi, although this was optional: “The University of Washington acknowledges the Coast Salish peoples of this land, the land which touches the shared waters of all tribes and bands within the Suquamish, Tulalip and Muckleshoot nations.”
Professor Reges instead stated the following on his syllabus: “I acknowledge that by the labor theory of property the Coast Salish people can claim historical ownership of almost none of the land currently occupied by the University of Washington.” There was evidence that the professor also subsequently used the parody in the signature block of some of his e-mails.
Students complained about the parody land acknowledgement, and some Indigenous students at the university who learned of it came forward to describe they felt impacted in their studies. The university’s administration removed Reges’s syllabus, initiated a disciplinary investigation against him, withheld a merit pay increase, reprimanded him, and warned him of future sanctions.
Reges sued for violation of his First Amendment rights, relying on an important modification to the test described above for constitutional free speech protection available to public employees serving as faculty members – in particular, the “official duties” exception to protection will not apply to faculty speech related to their “scholarship or teaching.” The balancing test requirement described above, however, still applies.
The District Court initially granted summary judgment to the university, applying the First Amendment balancing test, and concluded that the institution’s interest in preventing disruption and maintaining an inclusive environment outweighed Reges’s free speech interests.
On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed that decision, and held Reges’s parody was protected academic speech (i.e., related to “scholarship and teaching”) on a matter of public concern, and that student offense alone cannot justify retaliation by a public employer. The Court emphasized that “debate and disagreement are hallmarks of higher education” and that “student discomfort with a professor’s views … is not grounds for the university retaliating against the professor.”
In applying this First Amendment balancing, the majority found that the university failed to demonstrate that its interests outweighed Reges’s right to speak, noting that claimed disruptions were insufficient to overcome his First Amendment rights. The Court directed that summary judgment be entered for Reges on his retaliation and viewpoint discrimination claims.
One judge on the three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed and wrote a dissent arguing the disruption to Indigenous students’ learning justified limiting Professor’s Reges’s speech. (In addition, a prominent law professor, Erwin Chemerinsky, has taken issue with the majority decision in Reges, among other ways by criticizing the conclusion that a computer science professor’s parody land acknowledgement related to his scholarship and teaching, i.e., his academic field of computer science. See Erwin Chemerinsky, 9th Circuit Expands 1st Amendment Protection for Professor’s Syllabus Speech – And Gets it Wrong, Daily Journal (Jan. 15, 2026).) [DU3]
Conclusion:
What guidance can public agencies draw from decisions like these? First, disruption and impact on an agency’s operations have significant importance in the third element for free speech protection, i.e., the balancing of interests. Second, as articulated by the Court in Thompson how the speech at issue tends to undermine the employee’s particular role also has great importance: in that case, the assistant principal’s job was to uphold certain institutional values but the Court opined that the virulent Facebook statements imperiled his role in doing so, and this effect swayed the Court’s analysis in balancing. By contrast, Professor Reges’s statements were arguably interpreted to be consistent with the role of a faculty member to challenge accepted thinking at times and to provoke debate (although one judge on the panel disagreed, using reasoning more aligned with the Court’s in Thompson).
Finally, at least for purposes of evaluating First Amendment protection, how the employee’s speech came to light did not figure prominently in the Court’s analysis in either case. Ironically, the assistant principal did not in any way seek to promote his Facebook comments at the school and had a private account, whereas the university professor affirmatively promoted and publicized his statements to the community. What mattered primarily to the Court in evaluating balancing was impact on the educational institution and ability of the employees to do their jobs.
First Amendment issues in employment require careful consideration. Trusted legal counsel can help navigate challenges in this continually developing area of law.
[DU1]https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-5263/24-5263-2025-12-29.html
[DU2]https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/24-3518/24-3518-2025-12-19.html
[DU3]https://www.dailyjournal.com/articles/389352-9th-circuit-expands-1st-amendment-protection-for-professors-syllabus-speech-and-gets-it-wrong






