Last week, on October 31, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument in two important cases concerning the First Amendment and government agencies.  Both cases present the question of when and how First Amendment free speech standards apply to government officials in curating public comments on their social media pages.  

The cases are O’Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier involving Trustees of the Poway Unified School District near San Diego, and Lindke v. Freed, involving a City Manager in Michigan.  In both cases, members of the public posted comments on the officials’ Facebook or Twitter (now X) pages and had their comments deleted, hidden, or blocked by the officials.  The federal appellate court in Garnier found in favor of the members of the public, whereas the court in Lindke found in favor of the official.  Both cases turned on the key disputed legal issue of whether the officials’ activities on their social pages constituted state action.  First Amendment free speech protection binds only government actors, and if the officials could prove their social media pages basically operated only as their personal pages, then they could avoid liability for improper censorship in deleting comments or blocking members of the public. 

In reviewing and deciding the two cases, the U.S. Supreme Court will need to resolve inconsistencies between the federal appellate courts on how to test if state action exists in this social media context.  As a very general matter, the test applied by the appellate court in Garnier emphasized how the official’s page appears to the public, whereas the Freed court emphasized how the social media page actually functioned as an extension of the work of the official’s agency.

This post describes these two cases, which illustrate how the legal issues come up in practice.  It then describes some general guidelines for public agencies regarding how to address issues of censorship on social media while awaiting the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions.

Underlying facts of the cases:

O’Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier involves two members of the Poway Unified School District Board of Trustees, who in 2014 created public Facebook and Twitter pages to promote their campaigns for office.  As the Court of Appeals’ opinion described: “After they won and assumed office, the two used their public social media pages to inform constituents about goings-on at the School District and on the PUSD Board, to invite the public to Board meetings, to solicit input about important Board decisions, and to communicate with parents about safety and security issues at the District’s schools.”  The Garniers, parents of two children in the District, often left comments on the social media pages critical of the Trustees, and at times re-posted the same long criticisms.  The Trustees first deleted or hid these posts, and then eventually blocked the Garniers from the pages.  The Garniers thereafter sued, alleging this constituted censorship of their speech that violated the First Amendment.

Lindke v. Freed involved the Facebook page of Port Huron City Manager James Freed, who posted both personal content and content related to his job.  As the Court of Appeals’ opinion described: “Freed was an active Facebook user whose page featured a medley of posts.  He shared photos of his daughter’s birthday, his visits to local community events, and his family’s weekend picnics. He also posted about some of the administrative directives he issued as city manager.  And when the Covid-19 pandemic hit in spring 2020, he posted about that too, sharing the policies he initiated for Port Huron and news articles on public-health measures and statistics.”  Plaintiff Kevin Lindke took issue with how Freed was handling the pandemic response, and posted critical comments on the Facebook page.  Freed responded by deleting the posts, and eventually blocking Lindke from the page to prevent Lindke from commenting.  Freed then sued for violation of his First Amendment rights.

Oral argument before the Supreme Court:

The U.S. Supreme Court heard both cases on the morning of October 31, 2023, in an argument session that spanned about three hours to cover both cases.  Plaintiffs’ side for the most part advocated an appearance-based test for state action.  Under this test, if it appeared that the official was exercising his government authority in maintaining the page, even if it was by simply posting updates news reports about local issues, or information about upcoming decisions, then this favored a finding of state action.  Also, it would support state action if the way the individual used social media was only possible because of their office.  On the other hand, the public officials supported a test that would be less easy for plaintiffs to satisfy.  It required the existence of government requirement or control over what the official did or the official’s actual exercise of government authority through the social media presence.

There appeared no consensus among the Justices as to which test to apply, and argument focused a good deal on the Justices asking questions that explored the outer parameters of what their ruling would mean.  For example, Justice Thomas asked a couple of times whether it was important, and how it mattered, that the alleged public forum at issue resided on privately owned property in cyberspace subject to its own rules and regulations, of Facebook and X respectively.  Justice Kagan emphasized in her questions that, in developing a test for state action in the context social media, the Court was considering a medium that has changed rapidly in a short period of time and that could undergo further fundamental changes relatively soon.

With the cases now both submitted, Supreme Court decisions in the cases could issue in the next several months, but more likely toward June 2024.  The Supreme Court in its opinions will then be able to provide guidance on these important issues in time for the November 2024 election.

Practical considerations for agencies and government officials while the cases are pending:

How can agencies honor their obligations under the First Amendment yet avoid having their public officials serve inadvertently as the message board for certain types of content?  There are a number of ways (until the U.S. Supreme Court provides further guidance through its opinions in Garnier and Lindke).

First, agencies can recommend that public officials separate their personal social media presence from the pages they intend to use that have any significant relationship to their government work.  This may mean one page for personal use (ideally limited to friends or other particular connections) and one page related to the individual’s government work. 

Second, for public official social media pages that do reference government work or agency operations, public officials can set up their own rules or guidelines for how their pages should operate so that their decisions to curate comments can have a good chance of complying with First Amendment standards.  Indeed, cities, counties, special districts, and other government agencies that maintain their own social media pages already often do, and should, have such policies.  An official’s putting such a policy into place involves developing it in specific written terms (ideally with the help of counsel) and then notifying social media page users of the policy. The policy can specify, for example, that obscene, defamatory, and other similar types of public comments are not permitted.  If posts are limited to certain topics or users, the policy can also specify that comments have to relate to the matter originally posted.  The policy can describe that repetitive or overly long comments, subject to a specific word or other limitation, will be deleted.   

In general, the policy must satisfy the “forum analysis” standards of free speech law, a primary requirement of which is that the policy operate in a “viewpoint-neutral” way.  This means that the public official in almost all circumstances cannot suppress one view on a topic yet allow comments favoring the opposing view.  In addition, the official must be able to justify the policy’s restrictions on certain types of comments in a way that will satisfy forum analysis requirements.

We will keep you advised of developments.  Because this area of law is developing rapidly, it is best to involve legal counsel in crafting policies related to social media and for which there are any First Amendment concerns.

In 2022, the California Legislature passed and Governor Newsom approved, Assembly Bill 2188 (AB 2188).  Effective January 1, 2024, AB 2188 amends California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) to make it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a person in hiring, termination, or any term or condition of employment, or otherwise penalize a person if the discrimination is based on either of the following:

  1. The person’s use of cannabis off the job and away from the workplace; or
  2. An employer-required drug screening test that has found the person to have nonpsychoactive cannabis metabolites in their hair, blood, urine, or other bodily fluids.

This year, the California Legislature passed and the Governor approved, Senate Bill 700 (SB 700), which further modifies the law enacted by AB 2188 to also make it unlawful for an employer to request information from an applicant for employment relating to the applicant’s prior use of cannabis.  Further, a person’s prior cannabis use obtained from the person’s criminal history may only be considered or inquired into to the extent the employer is permitted to do so under California’s Fair Chance Act (Gov. Code, § 12952), or other state or federal law.

In the October 2022 blog post, New Law Prohibits Discrimination in Employment for Outside-of-Work Cannabis Use, LCW wrote about what employers need to know about AB 2188 in anticipation of its January 1, 2024, effective date, and recommended employers do the following in consultation with trusted legal counsel to prepare for AB 2188 to take effect:

  • Assess which categories of employees, if any, may be exempt from AB 2188;
  • Review drug and alcohol free workplace policies for any necessary changes to comply with AB 2188, and make those revisions in time to be adopted effective January 1, 2024; and
  • Review and update any drug testing policies and practices for employees covered by AB 2188 to eliminate testing that screens for non-psychoactive cannabis metabolites, and instead use testing that only indicates impairment on the job, such as the presence of THC.
  • Make those revisions in time to be adopted effective January 1, 2024.

In addition to the above and in consideration of SB 700, employers should further review and assess their hiring practices to ensure that they are not requesting from applicants any information relating to prior cannabis use, except where permitted under California’s Fair Chance Act or other state or federal law.  Trusted legal counsel can assist employers in determining how AB 2188 and SB 700 impacts their practices and operations, and to help in taking the necessary steps to prepare for these two pieces of legislation to take effect.

It was Friday July 5, 2013.  I was sitting in my doctor’s office.  I was desperately hoping I was fine, but had a sinking feeling I was having a miscarriage.  The doctor’s office was packed because it was closed the day before.  I was anxious, scared, and had a current of emotions coursing through me. If that wasn’t enough to worry about, a partner I was working for at my law firm at the time (not LCW) kept emailing me asking when I could meet that day to discuss a case. While I did not want him thinking I was making excuses and secretly taking off for the long weekend, I did not feel comfortable saying anything more than I was at a doctor’s appointment.  He kept asking me when I would be in, but I had no idea how long it would take, and felt that if my suspicions unfortunately proved to be true, I would not be mentally or physically able to go into the office that day.  In the end, I was having a miscarriage, I did not go into the office, and told him I was sick and could not meet.  I did however go on a business trip with that partner on Monday and pretend everything was fine, when it certainly was not.

Now with recently enacted legislation, California employees will have the right to leave for reproductive loss that will hopefully avoid them having to face the pressure of working when suffering a miscarriage or other reproductive loss.  On October 10, 2023, Governor Newsom signed Senate Bill No. 848 which requires employers with five or more employees to provide up to five days of Reproductive Loss Leave for employees starting January 1, 2024.  California is the second state to provide employees with Reproductive Loss Leave.

Requirements of Reproductive Loss Leave

Who does the law apply to?  Employers with five or more employees and the state and any political or civil subdivision of the state, including, but not limited to, cities and counties.

Who is eligible to take reproductive loss leave?  An employee that has worked for the employee for 30 days and has suffered a reproductive loss event.  A “reproductive loss event” is defined as “the final day of a failed adoption, failed surrogacy, miscarriage, stillbirth, or an unsuccessful assisted reproduction.” “Assisted reproduction” “means a method of achieving a pregnancy through an artificial insemination or embryo transfer.” (Cal. Govt. Code sections 12945.6 (a)(1) and (7).)

How much leave is an employee able to take, and when can they take the leave?  The employee is able to take up to five days of leave, which must occur within three months from the reproductive loss event.  However, if the employee uses Pregnancy Disability Leave (PDL) or leave under the California Family Rights Act (CFRA), the leave can commence within three months from the end of that leave.  The leave can be on nonconsecutive days.

Can employees take Reproductive Loss Leave more than once?  Yes.  If an employee experiences more than one reproductive loss event within a 12-month period, an employer must allow the employee to take up to 20 days of Reproductive Loss Leave within a 12-month period.

Are employees required to be paid on leave?  Reproductive Loss Leave shall be taken pursuant to any existing applicable leave policy of the employer.  In the absence of a leave policy, Reproductive Loss Leave is unpaid.  Employees can use sick, vacation, or other available paid leave.

Are employees required to submit documentation?  No, the law does not require employees to submit any documentation or medical certification to take Reproductive Loss Leave.

Anything else employers should know about Reproductive Loss Leave?  Yes!

  1. The law requires confidentiality.  All information employees provide to request Reproductive Loss Leave should be kept confidential and only shared with internal personnel or counsel as needed.
  2. Like with PDL and CFRA, employers may not interfere with an employee’s right to take Reproductive Loss Leave, or retaliate against employees for requesting or taking this leave.
  3. Employees should create written policies providing Reproductive Loss Leave to employees.
  4. It should be understood that employees undergoing a miscarriage, failed adoption, or other reproductive loss event are suffering mentally and/or physically.  Employers should provide notice to all employees on the availability of Reproductive Loss Leave.  Create a workplace that is open and inclusive and where employees can feel secure in their jobs and not fear retaliation from requesting or taking Reproductive Loss Leave.  Employers should be supportive of employees requesting this leave, not pressure them to work through it, and should also be understanding that allowing employees this leave to heal or grieve, will allow employees to come back to work more focused and able to perform at their best.

On October 4, 2023, Governor Newsom signed Senate Bill (“SB”) 616 into law.

SB 616 amends the Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act of 2014 (Labor Code sections 245-249) to increase the minimum number of paid sick days to which employees, including public employees, are entitled as well as the minimum number of days employees may carry over from one year of employment to the next. While these substantive changes do not apply to employees who are covered by certain Memorandums of Understanding (“MOUs”) or Collective Bargaining Agreements (“CBAs”), employees covered by such contractual agreements nevertheless will receive certain procedural protections against discrimination and retaliation related to the use of paid sick leave that they did not previously possess.

Before SB 616 takes effect January 1, 2024, here is what your agency needs to know about the law, so that your agency can revise your personnel policies as necessary to comply with the new legal obligations.

The Current Law

The Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act of 2014 (Labor Code sections 245-249) establishes paid sick leave entitlements for most employees in California.

Currently, the substantive benefits and procedural protections under the law do not extend to employees who are covered by an MOU or a CBA that provides the following: (1) paid sick days, leave or time off; (2) final and binding arbitration; and (3) a regular hourly rate of pay not less than thirty percent (30%) more than the state minimum wage (i.e., $20.80 per hour on January 1, 2024 when the minimum wage increases to $16.00 per hour).

Under the current law, employers must allow covered employees to accrue paid sick leave at a rate not less than one (1) hour of leave accrued for every 30 hours of work (known as the 1:30 accrual rate). Employers may use a different accrual method, so long as employees receive a minimum of three (3) days (or 24 hours) of paid sick leave by the employees’ 120th calendar day of employment. Alternatively, current law allows employers to front-load the “full amount of leave” (i.e., providing three (3) days (or 24 hours) of paid sick leave) at the beginning of each year of employment, calendar year, or 12-month period).

While current law entitles covered employees to accrue and carry over from one year of employment to the next a certain amount of paid sick leave, the law does not require employers to allow employees to accrue more than six (6) days (or 48 hours) of paid sick leave nor does the law require employers to allow employees to carry over more than three (3) days (or 24 hours) of such leave. If an employer elects to front-load sick leave, the employer is not obligated to allow employees to carry over any sick leave that they may have remaining at the end of the year because there is the understanding that employees will receive their full allocation of sick leave at the beginning of the next year of employment, calendar year, or 12-month period.

The current law also only provides procedural protections to covered employees (i.e., those not subject to MOUs or CBAs like those defined above). Such employees receive statutory protection related to their use or attempted use of paid sick leave, including the right to use accrued sick leave and the right to be free from discrimination related to the use or attempted use of such leave and to be free from retaliation if they file a complaint with the Labor Commissioner regarding paid sick leave violations. Employees who are not covered by the Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act are not entitled to these procedural protections currently.

The New Paid Sick Leave Landscape

The enactment of SB 616 will make a number of significant changes to paid sick leave entitlements for and procedural protections available to employees under the Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act.

The new law does not change 1:30 accrual rate set forth under the existing law. However, for employers that use a different accrual method, the law now requires that they provide employees a minimum of five (5) days (or 40 hours) of paid sick leave by the employees’ 200th calendar day of employment. This new statutory requirement supplements the existing requirement that such employers provide employees three (3) days (or 24 hours) of paid sick leave by the employees’ 120th calendar day of employment.

If an employer uses the 1:30 method or a different accrual method, the employer must allow the employee to carry over any accrued sick leave from year to year. Using one of these accrual methods, the employer must now allow an employee to accrue up to 10 days or 80 hours of paid sick leave.

Under the new law, the alternative front-loading approach remains available to employers, so long as the employer front-loads the “full amount of leave”, which is five (5) days or 40 hours of paid sick leave. Employers that elect to front-load five (5) days or 40 hours of paid sick leave are not required to allow employees to carryover leave from one year to the next.

Finally, the new law extends the procedural protections that were previously only available to employees who were not covered by an MOU or CBA to those that are covered by such a contractual agreement.

Steps to Making Sure Your Organization Is Ready

Given these significant changes to paid sick leave law, it is important that employers act promptly in order to ensure compliance with the new legal obligations when they take effect January 1, 2024.

  1. Review the Agency’s Paid Sick Leave Policies: Review the agency’s existing paid sick leave policy to ensure that the policy satisfies the new substantive requirements regarding accrual and carry-over of paid sick leave under the Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act for employees who are covered by the law and entitled to those substantive benefits.
  2. Review the Agency MOUs or CBAs: Review and analyze the agency’s MOUs and CBAs to determine whether the agreements provide for (1) paid sick days, leave or time off; (2) final and binding arbitration; and (3) sufficient compensation to employees. If the MOUs or CBAs do not satisfy the requirements for exemption from the substantive requirements under Labor Code section 245, understand that the employees covered by such MOUs or CBAs will be entitled to those substantive benefits.
  3. Consider the Status of an Employee: For employers with part-time employees, consider the front-loading approach, which will likely reduce the administrative burden associated with the monitoring hours worked by employees who may work irregular hours.
  4. Provide Procedural Protections for All Employees: Extend the procedural protections set forth under Labor Code section 246.5 to all employees, including those that are covered by an MOU or CBA that satisfies the requirements for exemption from the substantive requirements of the Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act.
  5. Communicate: Communicate to affected employee organizations any changes to policy or practice that the agency must make in order to comply with the changes to the law. An agency does not need to negotiate a change that is necessary in order to comply with the law, but it should communicate that it is changing its policy or practice and provide the employee organizations an opportunity to identify any negotiable effects or impacts of the decision and request to bargain those effects or impacts.
  6. Document, Document, Document: Maintain thorough records that the agency reviewed and, if necessary, revised its policies or practices to comply with the law.
  7. Consult Trusted Legal Advisors: If you are uncertain about how the changes in the law may affect your agency or if you need guidance in updating your policies, consider consulting with your trusted legal advisors.

By following these steps, your agency can ensure that it is fully prepared for the changes that will take effect January 1, 2024.

This article was originally published in October 2019.  The information has been reviewed and is up-to-date as of October 2023.

Many workplaces and schools engage in Halloween celebrations, and with good reason.  LCW is no exception:

However, Halloween parties can be scary for risk managers, as they carry the potential to put a few skeletons in an employer’s closet.  Here are some tricks to keep your Halloween party from raising the specter of liability:

  • Employees Should Know They are Free to “Ghost”.  Participation in any Halloween festivities should be entirely optional.  Employees may not feel comfortable celebrating Halloween; for some employees, it may be prohibited by their religious beliefs.  Nobody should be required to take part, and an employer should not tolerate teasing or ostracism of an employee who opts out.  It’s only fun if everyone’s having fun.
  • When Choosing Costumes, Don’t Let the Zombies Eat Your Brain.  Dracula, Frankenstein, Mickey Mouse, Elsa and/or Anna, a cowboy, an M & M, a puppy, any of the three PJ Masks. . . there are nearly unlimited options for inoffensive Halloween costumes.  And yet, every year, some ghouls make the news by wearing costumes that would give any employer nightmares.  Human Resources professionals can reduce this risk by providing common-sense guidance as to what is an appropriate costume for a Halloween celebration at the office:
    • An attempt to “wear” or parody another culture, religion, race, or identity is not a costume; it’s an exhibit in someone else’s lawsuit for harassment or discrimination.  It should go without saying that blackface or brownface is unacceptable.  The same is true of traditional cultural dress.  A good costume does not make one’s colleagues feel caricatured, mocked, or belittled for their protected characteristics.  On the other hand, an employee should not be prohibited from wearing expressions of his or her own identity.  Context matters.
    • At some point, Halloween shifted from being an opportunity for kids to get free candy to an opportunity for adults to free themselves of their inhibitions.  Inhibitions can be a good thing at work.  A Halloween costume should not expose any part of an employee’s body that ordinary work clothes would not.  If a costume is described by the seller as “sexy” or some euphemism therefor, it is probably better saved for a non-work outing.  Bottom line: the provisions of the employer’s dress code related to appropriate attire still apply.
  • No Creepy Behavior.   Despite HR’s best efforts, some employees may wear provocative costumes to the office.  This does not give other employees license to make comments or engage in conduct that would otherwise violate the employer’s harassment or other conduct policies.  If the behavior is beyond the pale, Halloween does not provide a get-out-of-Hades-free card.
  • Stay Safe Out There. If your employees work with equipment that may impact their health or safety, extra care should be taken to ensure that costumes do not imperil employees.  Some Halloween revelers like to accessorize costumes with fake weapons; realistic-looking toys could cause legitimate fear; these should not be allowed.

If an employer utilizes these few simple tricks, the office Halloween party should be a treat, and the only stomachache a risk manager should suffer is from raiding the candy bowl.

The California Civil Rights Department recently modified the regulation (2 CCR § 11017.1) associated with California’s Fair Chance Act.  The regulation addresses an employer’s restrictions and obligations for considering an applicant or employee’s criminal history.  The modified regulation took effect on October 1, 2023.

Employers should be aware of the modifications to this regulation, and should review their current hiring policies and practices and make any necessary or appropriate revisions.  We discuss some of the key modifications and clarifications below.

Modifications & Clarifications to the Individualized Assessment

California’s Fair Chance Act generally prohibits employers from inquiring about or using an applicant’s criminal history before the employer makes the applicant a conditional offer of employment, with some limited exceptions.

When an employer intends to deny an applicant due to conviction history (either solely or in part) a position it conditionally offered to the applicant, the employer must first conduct an individualized assessment of whether the applicant’s conviction history has a direct and adverse relationship with the specific duties of the job that justify denying the applicant the position.  As part of the individualized assessment, the employer must consider, at minimum, the following factors:

  1. The nature and gravity of the offense or conduct;
  2. The time that has passed since the offense or conduct and/or completion of the sentence; and
  3. The nature of the job held or sought.

The modified regulation provides examples of the types of information that employers may consider for each of the above factors.  First, consideration of the nature and gravity of the offense or conduct may include:

  • The specific personal conduct of the applicant that resulted in the conviction;
  • Whether the harm was to property or people;
  • The degree of the harm (e.g., amount of loss in theft);
  • The permanence of the harm;
  • The context in which the offense occurred;
  • Whether a disability, including but not limited to a past drug addiction or mental impairment, contributed to the offense or conduct, and if so, whether the likelihood of harm arising from similar conduct could be sufficiently mitigated or eliminated by a reasonable accommodation, or whether the disability has been mitigated or eliminated by treatment or otherwise;
  • Whether trauma, domestic or dating violence, sexual assault, stalking, human trafficking, duress, or other similar factors contributed to the offense or conduct; and/or
  • The age of the applicant when the conduct occurred.

Second, consideration of the time that has passed since the offense or conduct and/or completion of the sentence may include:

  • The amount of time that has passed since the conduct underlying the conviction, which may significantly predate the conviction itself; and/or
  • When the conviction led to incarceration, the amount of time that has passed since the applicant’s release from incarceration.

Third, consideration of the nature of the job held or sought may include:

  • The specific duties of the job;
  • Whether the context in which the conviction occurred is likely to arise in the workplace; and/or
  • Whether the type or degree of harm that resulted from the conviction is likely to occur in the workplace.

The modified regulation states that an applicant’s possession of a benefit, privilege, or right required for the performance of a job by a licensing, regulatory, or government agency or board is probative of the applicant’s conviction history not being directly and adversely related to the specific duties of that job.

The modified regulation also requires employers to consider any evidence of rehabilitation or mitigating circumstances that is voluntarily provided by the applicant, or by another party at the applicant’s request, before or during the individualized assessment.

Modifications & Clarifications to Employer’s Notice Obligations

The modified regulations also amend and expand upon an employer’s notice obligations when, after conducting the individualized assessment, the employer makes a preliminary decision that the applicant’s conviction history disqualifies the applicant from the employment conditionally offered.  In that event, an employer is required to provide written notice to the applicant that contains all of the following:

  1. Notice of the disqualifying conviction or convictions that are the basis for the preliminary decision to rescind the offer.
  2. A copy of the conviction history report utilized or relied on by the employer, if any (e.g., consumer reports, credit reports, public records, results of internet searches, news articles, or any other writing containing information related to the conviction history that was utilized or relied upon by the employer).
  3. Notice of the applicant’s right to respond to the notice before the preliminary decision rescinding the offer of employment becomes final.
  4. An explanation informing the applicant that, if the applicant chooses to respond, the response may include submission of (a) evidence challenging the accuracy of the conviction history report that is the basis for the preliminary decision to rescind the offer, or (b) evidence of rehabilitation or mitigating circumstances.
  5. Notice of the deadline for the applicant to respond, if the applicant chooses to do so, which must be at least five business days from the date of the applicant’s receipt of the notice (the modified regulation provides direction on determining when notice is received based on various methods of transmission).

The modified regulation provides a number of examples of evidence, including documentary evidence, of rehabilitation or mitigating circumstances that applicants may provide.  Employers cannot require applicants to provide evidence of rehabilitation or mitigating circumstances.  If, however, applicants choose to provide that information, employers must accept it.

The modified regulation further prohibits employers from taking a number of actions during this process, including:

  1. Requiring an applicant to provide a specific type of documentary evidence (e.g., a police report as evidence of domestic or dating violence);
  2. Disqualifying an applicant from the employment conditionally offered for failing to provide any specific type of documents or other evidence;
  3. Requiring an applicant to disclose their status as a survivor of domestic or dating violence, sexual assault, stalking, or comparable statuses; and/or
  4. Requiring an applicant to produce medical records and/or disclose the existence of a disability or diagnosis.

As under the prior regulation, if an applicant provides timely written notice to the employer that the applicant disputes the accuracy of the conviction history and is taking specific steps to obtain evidence supporting the applicant’s assertion, then the applicant must receive at least five additional business days to respond before the employer’s decision to rescind the conditional employment offer becomes final.

Also as under the prior regulation, employers must consider any information submitted by the applicant before making a final decision regarding whether or not to rescind the conditional offer of employment.  The modified regulation, however, provides that when considering evidence of rehabilitation or mitigating circumstances, employers may consider the following factors in addition to those set forth above as part of the individualized assessment:

  1. When the conviction led to incarceration, the applicant’s conduct during incarceration, including participation in work and educational or rehabilitative programming and other prosocial conduct;
  2. The applicant’s employment history since the conviction or completion of sentence;
  3. The applicant’s community service and engagement since the conviction or completion of sentence, including but not limited to volunteer work for a community organization, engagement with a religious group or organization, participation in a support or recovery group, and other types of civic participation; and/or
  4. The applicant’s other rehabilitative efforts since the completion of sentence or conviction or mitigating factors.

Employers remain obligated to provide written notice to an applicant when the employer makes a final decision to rescind the conditional offer and deny an application based solely or in part on the applicant’s conviction history.  Employers may use the sample Final Notice to Revoke Job Offer form, and other forms, from the California Civil Rights Department.

Expanded Definition of “Applicant”

The modified regulation expands the definition of “applicant” to generally include:

  1. Any individual who files a written application or, where an employer or other covered entity does not provide an application form, any individual who otherwise indicates a specific desire to an employer or other covered entity to be considered for employment;
  2. Individuals who have been conditionally offered employment, even if they have commenced employment when the employer undertakes a post-conditional offer review and consideration of criminal history;
  3. Existing employees who have applied or indicated a specific desire to be considered for a different position with their current employer; and
  4. An existing employee who is subjected to a review and consideration of criminal history because of a change in ownership, management, policy, or practice.

Certain Positions Remain Exempt from the Pre-Conditional Offer Inquiry/Use Prohibition

Under the modified regulations, certain positions continue to be exempt from the prohibition on pre-conditional offer criminal history inquiry and use.  For example, employers may continue to inquire about or use criminal history before a conditional offer of employment for positions with criminal justice agencies, or for positions for which a state, federal, or local law requires an employer to conduct criminal background checks or to restrict employment based on criminal history.

The modified regulations do, however, clarify that in order for the exemption to apply for positions for which a state, federal, or local law requires an employer to conduct criminal background checks or to restrict employment based on criminal history, the applicable law must require that the employer – and not another entity (e.g., an occupational licensing board) – conduct the criminal background check.

Modifications & Clarifications to the “Job Related and Consistent with Business Necessity” Burden Shifting

If an applicant or employee demonstrates that an employer’s policy or practice of considering criminal convictions creates an adverse impact on applicants or employees based on classifications protected by the Fair Employment and Housing Act, the burden shifts to the employer to establish that the policy or practice is nonetheless justifiable because it is job-related and consistent with business necessity.  In doing so, the employer must take into account at least the following factors:

  1. The nature and gravity of the offense or conduct;
  2. The time that has passed since the offense or conduct and/or completion of the sentence; and
  3. The nature of the job held or sought.

The modified regulation clarifies that if an employer demonstrates that its policy or practice of considering criminal convictions is job-related and consistent with business necessity, adversely impacted employees or applicants may still prevail in a claim against the employer if they can demonstrate that there is a less discriminatory policy or practice that serves the employer’s goals as effectively as the challenged policy or practice, such as a more narrowly targeted list of convictions or another form of inquiry that evaluates job qualification or risk as accurately without significantly increasing the cost or burden on the employer.

Final Note

As this article does not address every aspect of the modified regulation, employers are encouraged to contact trusted legal counsel to assist with fully understanding all of the modifications and their impact on the employer’s hiring policies and practices.

Editorial note: On October 8, 2023, Governor Newsom vetoed AB 504. His veto message stated, “Unfortunately, this bill is overly broad in scope and impact. The bill has the potential to seriously disrupt or even halt the delivery of critical public services, particularly in places where public services are co-located. This could have significant, negative impacts on a variety of government functions including academic operations for students, provision of services in rural communities where co-location of government agencies is common, and accessibility of a variety of safety net programs for millions of Californians.


Pending California Assembly Bill 504 (Reyes) proposes to establish a fundamental right for public employees to engage in a “sympathy strike.” The bill would amend the Government Code to provide the right of public employees to demonstrate solidarity with other public employees by honoring a strike, or by refusing to enter upon the premises of or perform work for a public employer engaged in a primary strike. The bill has been passed by the state legislature and presented to the Governor for signature.

Under current law, public employers and unions can agree to “no strike” provisions that prohibit sympathy strikes. Under the pending legislation, such agreements would be voided and parties would be required to negotiate new provisions.

This blog post critiques AB 504, which is currently awaiting signature by the Governor. The post first describes how existing law prevents “essential services” workers from striking, and how public employers can negotiate line worker agreements and petition PERB to seek an injunction when such workers threaten to do so. This post describes that, under existing, law, this process is already burdensome and in many cases ineffective. This post then explains how AB 504 will make the process even more unworkable, and thereby disserve the public interest. The right of workers to strike is valuable, but AB 504 is not the way honor it.

Current Limitations on the Ability of Essential Employees to Strike

California public employees represented by labor unions have the legal right to strike. There are a few exceptions where certain employees are prohibited from striking because they are essential to public health and safety.

 “Essential services” are services essential to protect the health or safety of the public during a strike. Police officers and firefighters are obvious examples of employees who are essential to public safety. However, other public servants have also been found to be essential during a labor strike. These are typically positions staffed around the clock, such as 911 dispatchers, cooks in detention facilities, staff of special care homes, social workers in charge of emergency child welfare, and animal control officers. Essential positions may also include legal processors in criminal courts, water treatment operators, victim advocates, and IT professionals in charge of public safety technology.

The Current Procedure to Maintain Essential Services During a Strike

 Whether employees are essential is considered a “complex and fact-intensive matter.” An employer must clearly demonstrate that disruption of services for the length of the strike would imminently and substantially threaten public health or safety. This determination requires a case-by-case analysis to determine whether the public interest overrides the right to strike.

During a strike, PERB requires that employers make all possible service reductions and consider all “other personnel” who can perform the essential services. “Other personnel” include supervisors, managers, exempted line workers, temporary employees, unrepresented employees, employees represented by non-striking bargaining units, and contractors. If “other personnel” can perform the duty in the event of a strike, generally PERB will not pursue injunctive relief to enjoin striking employees on behalf of the public employer.

Because the extent to which “other personnel” are available to provide essential services is relevant to a request to enjoin essential employees, the ability of any employee to participate in a sympathy strike complicates an employer’s efforts to maintain essential services during a strike.

Procedural Flaws Already Risk the Ability of Employers to Maintain Essential Services

Even with the law as it exists now, the process for an employer to have essential employees enjoined from striking is lengthy and in many cases ineffective. The steps are:

(1) An employer must consider “other personnel” available for coverage, and attempt to negotiate with the striking union to voluntarily exempt some employees from striking (“line workers”);

(2) An employer must file an unfair practice charge (UPC) with PERB asserting that a strike which will threaten public health or safety is imminent, along with a list of any essential positions not covered by “other personnel” or “line workers;”

(3) PERB will evaluate the UPC and decide whether to pursue injunctive relief in superior court to enjoin essential workers from striking;

(4) If PERB agrees that a strike threatening public health or safety is imminent, PERB will file a petition with superior court to enjoin essential employees from striking; and

(5) The superior court will rule on petition for injunctive relief.

This procedure is already in many cases ineffective for a number of reasons. For example:

  • The California Supreme Court has determined that 72 hours’ notice of a strike gives PERB sufficient time to process a petition and seek injunctive relief. While PERB may be able to file a petition in superior court within 72 hours, it is questionable whether a court can make and enforce a ruling within that time frame. Likely, the parties will still be litigating injunctive relief in court after the strike has begun.
  • There is no real recourse for employers to address line workers who fail to appear for work during a strike. While an employer can consider post-strike discipline or an unfair practice charge, by then, the damage to public health and safety is already done.

Likely Confusion from AB 504

AB 504 will create further delay and difficulty in an already burdensome process, further threatening an employers’ ability to maintain essential services.

1. An Employer’s Assessment of “Other Personnel” Available for Coverage Will Be Thwarted.

PERB requires employers to consider coverage options from “other personnel” before petitioning to enjoin a striking employee. However, if any of the “other personnel” can go out on a sympathy strike at any time, it is unclear how employers can make this determination. An employer cannot reasonably rely on “other personnel” if they can decide to go out on a sympathy strike at any time.

If an employer is required to negotiate with, and/or petition to enjoin “other personnel” who can perform essential services during a strike, this will delay an employer’s ability to petition PERB to enjoin essential employees.

Employers will have no timely recourse to address “other personnel” who at first voluntarily agree to cover essential services, and later decide to sympathy strike, putting essential services at risk.

2. Jurisdiction is Unclear.

A public entity’s claim that a threatened public employee strike is illegal generally constitutes an unfair labor practice claim, and therefore the claim, along with the determination of which employees are essential to public health and safety, comes within PERB’s initial jurisdiction.

The amended legislation states that it “does not alter existing law relating to strikes by essential employees as set forth in judicial decisions and decisions of PERB, as promulgated or revised from time to time.” And, PERB has jurisdiction over the chapter of the Government Code which would authorize sympathy strikes under AB 504.

However, under the pending legislation, where an unrepresented employee decides to assert the right to engage in a sympathy strike, no unfair practice will have been committed. Arguably, if an unfair practice claim is not at stake, PERB may not have jurisdiction to decide whether to pursue injunctive relief to enjoin a potential sympathy striker from striking who is (1) represented by a non-striking union or (2) unrepresented. It may be that the employer should file such petitions directly in superior court rather than with PERB. At this point, jurisdiction is murky.

3. Additional Steps Convolute an Already Dysfunctional Process.

The likely additional steps required of a public employer under AB 504 to negotiate with individual sympathy strikers and potentially file separate petitions to enjoin sympathy strikers adds to the already burdensome process employers must follow to protect essential services during a strike. This increases the likelihood that essential workers will not be enjoined before a strike starts, and that public health and safety services will go uncovered.

While the right to strike is an important protected right, it should not be at the cost of public health and safety. If this bill is signed by the Governor, these procedural questions will need to be addressed without delay in order to protect the public and vulnerable residents of local communities.

We are excited to continue our video series – Tips from the Table. In these videos, members of LCW’s Labor Relations and Collective Bargaining practice group will provide various tips that can be implemented at your bargaining tables. We hope that you will find these clips informative and helpful in your negotiations.

Flight attendant Charlene Carter sued her employer and her union alleging, among other things, that they discriminated against her on the basis of religion, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).  In July 2022, a jury awarded Ms. Carter $5.1 million.  This sum appears to be consistent with the increase in “nuclear verdicts” (that is, jury awards that far exceed expected reasonable or rational amounts), a phenomenon that has raised serious questions and concerns in recent years.  But that jury award is not at issue here.  After all, in December 2022, the Court reduced it significantly to $810,000.  Rather, at issue here is a Texas federal district court’s order imposing very specific “training” sanctions against three attorneys.

The “training” sanctions saga stems from the Court’s order that Ms. Carter’s employer, Southwest Airlines Co. (“Southwest”), notify flight attendants of Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of religion.  Southwest did issue a notification, which read: “the court ordered us to inform you that Southwest does not discriminate against our Employees for their religious practices and beliefs.”  (Internal punctuation and emphasis omitted.)  On August 7, 2023, the Court made its disapproval of the notification abundantly clear, writing:

It’s hard to see how Southwest could have violated the notice requirement more. Take these modified historical and movie anecdotes.  After God told Adam, “[Y]ou must not eat from the tree [in the middle of the garden],” imagine Adam telling God, “I do not eat from the tree in the middle of the garden”—while an apple core rests at his feet.  Or where Gandalf bellows, “You shall not pass,” the Balrog muses, “I do not pass,” while strolling past Gandalf on the Bridge of Khazad-dûm.

The Court held Southwest in civil contempt, and ordered it to pay Ms. Carter’s attorneys’ fees (in connection with her Motion for Contempt and Motion to Compel Proceedings), to issue a revised notice (verbatim from the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Sanctions in 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136623), and, as relevant here, to send three in-house attorneys to “religious-liberty training.” 

But the Court’s order did not simply stop at “religious-liberty training.”  Rather, it specifically provided that the “training” shall be provided by the Alliance Defending Freedom (an organization that describes itself as “the world’s largest legal organization committed to protecting religious freedom, free speech, the sanctity of life, marriage and family, and parental rights”), and Southwest must provide transportation, accommodation, food, or other travel expenses for the representative providing the “training.”  The training shall also be entirely at the Alliance Defending Freedom’s discretion; the organization may choose both the representative and the time set for it.

Judge Brantley Starr’s highly specific “training” sanctions did not go unnoticed.  Fix the Court, a judicial reform advocacy group, filed a complaint against Judge Starr with the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council.  Several major news outlets reported on the case and on Judge Starr’s order that the “training” be conducted by an ideologically-affiliated organization.  For its part, Southwest is currently appealing the order.  Whether the Fifth Circuit will ultimately permit it to stand remains an open question.

While the Fifth Circuit’s decision is pending, California attorneys and employers may be wondering whether they, too, may face similar “training” sanctions.  The short answer is: “training” sanctions, likely yes in certain circumstances; similar to those imposed in the Texas federal district court, likely not. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, subdivision (c)(1) (“Rule 11”) expressly provides for “appropriate sanctions” against attorneys and litigants alike, stating in relevant part: “the court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.”  Further, as noted in Carter, at least one California district court has already imposed training sanctions in the past, citing to Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. section 1927, and the inherent powers of the courts.  (See Moser v. Bret Harte Union High Sch. Dist. (E.D.Cal. 2005) 366 F.Supp.2d 944.)  However, as in Moser, such sanctions will more likely than not entail training provided by State Bar of California-approved programs (among which attorneys and/or litigants may choose) rather than training provided by ideologically-affiliated organizations.

To reduce the risk of incurring “training” or any other types of sanctions, California employers are encouraged to consult with experienced legal counsel in connection with complex legal questions, in particular as they pertain to Title VII’s or the Fair Employment and Housing Act’s prohibitions against discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.